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New England’s economy was built on
the teeming fishing grounds off its shores,
turning the region into an international
powerhouse by the eighteenth century.
The advance of technology increased the
efficiency of fishing operations. Unfortunately,
misguided management decisions gave an
illusion of prosperity that persisted until
recently; as fish dwindled, the dollars kept
flowing. Today, over half of the historic fish
populations are desperately overfished, a
mere shadow of what they were, and the
recent decade has witnessed a mass exodus
of fishermen from the historic fishing industry.
Now, the news reminds us repeatedly of the
demise of this iconic industry. What happened
to the fish that supported the fishermen and
their families, poured money into our coastal
communities and put food on our tables?
And is there any hope for a brighter future?
This report chronicles the rise and fall of
groundfish (cod, haddock and flounder) and
describes what happened to the New England
fishing economy as a consequence. It critiques
the days-at-sea management system and the
downward spiral it created.
Yet, in a change from the doom and gloom
that has surrounded fishermen in these last few
decades, this report also analyzes prospects for
the future of the fisheries, taking inspiration from
other successful and sustainable fisheries around
the world. It finds that there is indeed hope for
both the fish and the fishermen.
In 2006, federal law mandated the implementa-
tion of a new system of sustainable management.
This includes science-based catch limits to
rebuild fish populations and prevent overfishing,
and accountability measures like monitoring, so
fishermen and regulators know exactly how much
fish is being caught. As a result, fishing can stop
once reasonable catch limits have been reached.
Here in New England, community-based, fisher-
men-run cooperatives called sectors have been
proposed as a way to provide fishermen with the
flexibility to set their own fishing guidelines so
they can run their businesses more efficiently
and profitably while fish populations rebuild.
The authors of this report examine this solution
and compare it to other fisheries management
alternatives. Their findings are compelling
and offer the first concrete evidence that New
England fishery management does indeed
have a viable solution on the table.
It is time to act. There is much work to be done
to prepare for the changes ahead. It will require
commitment to a sustainable future and a lot
of elbow grease, but there is no time for delay.
The future of New England’s fisheries is now.
Peter Baker
Manager, New England Fisheries Campaign
Pew Environment Group
3In 1629, a minister in Salem, Massachusetts,
wrote of New England that “the abundance
of sea fish are almost beyond believing” (cited
in Kurlansky 1997, p. 70). Four centuries of
New England history, culture and economic
development are grounded in the harvest of
halibut, cod, haddock and other fish (White
1954; Northeast Fisheries Science Center 2004,
period 6, p. 1). “By the eighteenth century, cod
had lifted New England from a distant economy
of starving settlers to an international commer-
cial power” (Kurlansky 1997, p. 78). At the turn of
the twentieth century, New England fishermen
still earned 75 percent more for their labor than
those in other U.S. fisheries (McFarland 1911).
From 1929 to 1950, 76–87 percent of all U.S.
fresh and frozen fish flowed through New
England ports (White 1954, p. 15).
The New England fishery is also an archetype
of mismanagement. Historical records show
repeated patterns of boom-and-bust over-
exploitation and collapse (Edwards 1999).
Species that provided a historical foundation
for economic growth in New England—Atlantic
halibut, cod, flounder and others—have been
fished to decline, biological collapse or com-
mercial extinction. “One by one, many of the
most productive stocks have collapsed in the
wake of ever-advancing harvesting technology,
and failure of the management system to take
steps necessary to rebuild the populations”
(Northeast Fisheries Science Center 2004).
There are few examples of substantive and
long-term recovery. After decades of intensive
management, New England faces unprece-
dented low abundance for most stocks and
continuing decline of the fishing industry
(Northeast Fisheries Science Center 2004;
Edwards 1999).
The History of New England Groundfishing:
Exploitation of a Bounty
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FIGURE 1
Atlantic Halibut Total Catch from the Gulf of Maine
and Georges Bank, 1893–2005
Patterns of overexploitation continue today. Atlantic halibut,
for example, shows the classic boom-and-bust harvest
cycle with harvests collapsing by the mid-1940s. Record low
harvests continue today (Figure 1), with vessels allowed to
land only a single halibut per trip. Similar patterns are found
in Georges Bank and Gulf of Maine cod landings (Figure 2),
and in more recent biomass and landings of pollock, yellow-
tail flounder and witch flounder, among others. Even with
the somewhat more successful rebuilding of Georges Bank
haddock, overall trends are negative. National Marine
Fisheries Service data show a continual downward trend in
overall groundfish landings and inflation-adjusted revenues,
with the sole exception being a temporary increase due to
the exclusion of foreign factory trawlers from the 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone in 1976 and strong year classes of
cod and haddock in the late 1970s and haddock in the
early 2000s (Figure 3).
Socioeconomic consequences of fishery decline are seen
across New England. In the 1950s Gloucester, Massachusetts,
supported about 2,000 working fishermen; by the mid-1990s
the number had declined by 80 percent to only 400
(Kurlansky 1997). Occupational opportunities within the
New England fishing industry continue to decline, “with
more people leaving the industry then entering it” (NEFMC
2006, p. 344). Recent assessments point to deterioration in
the social structure, family life, sense of community and
financial resiliency of fishing communities.1 Fishery manage-
ment is marked by tensions and legal conflict; lawsuits often
challenge regulatory decisions. Government funds for
disaster relief, capacity reduction and other support now
help sustain the industry. Most of the fish processed in
locations such as Gloucester is now imported from Canada,
Iceland and Norway (NEFMC 2003). Recent years show little
sign of reversal in these long-term negative trends.
These Patterns Are Not New
“In the current policy debate
about rebuilding depleted
fisheries…, it is important to
recognize that fisheries for key
commercial species like cod
were far more productive in
the past.”
ROSENBERG ET AL. 2005, P. 78
Declines in landings and
productivity were reported
at least as early as the mid-
1800s and by the 1950s were
considered a grave concern.
MCFARLAND 1911; WHITE 1954
Biomass from a Historical Perspective:
Evidence from Canadian Waters
Estimates by Rosenberg et al. (2005) for fisheries on the
Canadian Scotian shelf suggest that current total ground-
fish biomass in some areas may be less than 4 percent of
that in the mid-1800s. These estimates are calculated from
the logs of 236 Beverly, Massachusetts, vessels fishing
solely on the shelf (an area now in Canadian waters, but
historically fished by New Englanders).
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FIGURE 2
Atlantic Cod Total Commercial Landings from the Gulf of Maine
and Georges Bank, 1893–2005 (3-Year Moving Average)
6The current condition of New England commercial fisheries is not a surprise.
New England groundfisheries, like many at-risk fisheries worldwide, are managed
through a byzantine set of effort or input controls that mandate when, where and
how fish may be caught. Amendment 13 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan lays out the basis for most of the regulations currently in place
for New England groundfish. The Amendment 13 document—over 1,300 pages
long with its considered alternatives and various analyses—details restrictions on
the number of days fished, fishing areas, trip limits, fish sizes and gear. Economics
and historical patterns predict the outcome of such regulations: weak control over
harvests; boom-and-bust cycles with decline of both harvests and stocks, long-term
dissipation of economic benefits; and eventual deterioration of the fishing industry.
Effort controls fail because they do not directly control the quantity of fish that is
caught and do not promote stewardship. Instead, these controls make catching fish
more difficult and expensive in the hope that this will reduce catch to a desired
level. Despite the best of these attempts, resilient fishermen repeatedly find new
and more effective ways to catch fish, even while complying with ever more
restrictive rules and regulations. Fishermen faced with increasingly strict days-at-sea
limits, for example, can use more effective gear, fish longer and harder during
available days, or take fewer safety precautions. Voluntary steps that might
otherwise be taken to protect the environment or prevent unintentional killing of
non-targeted fish or wildlife (called bycatch) are often abandoned. Economists
term these and other unintended responses to effort controls “effort substitution.”
The result is predictable: fishermen striving to harvest as many fish as possible,
as quickly as possible, in the fishing days and areas available. Even with most New
England groundfish stocks overfished, measures to further restrict effort have met
with “strong opposition [from] fishermen” (NEFMC 2003, pp. I-878). Fishermen
have “no plans to reduce their own effort [and many have] made investments …
to increase their current catch per day” (Olson and Clay 2001, p. 5). Resulting
patterns threaten both fish stocks and profits. Fisheries under effort controls are
less productive, safe and sustainable than those managed using more effective
methods. They are more damaging to ecosystems and often provide lower quality
products. If nothing is done to correct the situation, these fisheries decline and
often collapse. This is the history of New England fisheries.
Repeating History
“Many of the problems currently
faced by the industry were
foreseen as early as the first
decade of the [twentieth]
century. Increasingly efficient
fishing methods, competition
between fleet sectors employing
various gears, inability to act in
harmony with international
partners, and the failure to
heed scientific advice sound like
current themes, but in fact have
been echoed repeatedly since
the turn of the century[....] A
continuing trend over the past
century has been the overex-
ploitation and eventual collapse
of species after species.”
NORTHEAST FISHERIES SCIENCE
CENTER 2004, P. 1
Economics and New England Fisheries:
The Cause of a Crisis
The Worst of All Worlds
“We’re putting an awful lot
of costly regulatory constraints
on fishermen that aren’t
working, so we’re kind of
ending up in the worst of
all possible worlds.”
JAMES WILSON, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE MARINE
SCIENCE CENTER (QUOTED BY NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (WGBH) 2009)
7
FIGURE 3
Total New England Commercial Landings
of 12 Groundfish Species, 1950–2007
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8Days-at-Sea Regulation and Effort Controls
in New England: Have They Worked?
Since 1994, the central mechanism used to control the
harvest of New England groundfish has been limits on the
number of fishing vessels combined with complex restric-
tions on the number of days-at-sea that each vessel may fish,
trip limits restricting the amount of harvest during each trip,
and year-round and seasonal area closures. Since inception,
days-at-sea regulations have struggled with fundamental
problems. After 15 years with many updates and revisions,
days-at-sea regulations have achieved neither biological
nor economic goals (Georgianna et al. 2008).
Nearly 80 percent of the groundfish stocks were overfished
(15 out of 19 stocks), subject to overfishing, or both (NFSC
2008).2 From 2004 to 2007, the number of stocks both over-
fished and subject to overfishing increased 64 percent, from
7 to 11 stocks. The number of stocks neither overfished nor
subject to overfishing declined. Fishing revenues have fallen
for many species, continuing historical trends. From 2004 to
2006, for example, revenues from New England cod and
haddock declined 21 percent, while revenues from flounder
declined 14 percent (National Marine Fisheries Service 2006).
From an economic perspective, the failure of days-at-sea
and other effort controls to achieve sustainable, profitable
fisheries is a logical consequence of the fundamental nature
of effort controls and the ways that these controls have been
implemented. Other than the Northeast U.S., there are only
two other uses of days-at-sea to manage major fisheries—the
mixed trawl fishery in Scotland and demersal fisheries in the
Faroe Islands—with results and problems similar to those
found in New England (Georgianna et al. 2008; Rossiter and
Stead 2003; Jákupsstovu et al. 2007). No multispecies fishery
has ever prospered or been rebuilt successfully under days-
at-sea limits.
Too Many or Too Few Days?
According to the estimates of Edwards and Murawski (1993), and despite severe economic difficulty
in the New England fishery, there are still too many allocated days-at-sea. In addition, because of
the way days-at-sea are allocated, some vessels are severely restricted, while others are given more
days-at-sea than they use. Figure 4 shows the difference between allocated and used days-at-sea
over time in New England. Although this difference has narrowed as days-at-sea have become more
restricted and leasing and transfers have been allowed, there are still days that remain unused.
Why would a vessel not use all of its days-at-sea? In some cases, vessels have chosen to abandon
the fishery or spend time fishing for other species. In other cases, vessels were allocated more
days-at-sea than they had used in the past (Georgianna et al. 2008). Some experts worry that if
stocks begin to recover, some of these latent days-at-sea will be brought back into the fishery,
placing additional pressure on stocks.
9Days-at-Sea Limits Encourage Waste
When vessels only have a limited number of days-at-sea,
it creates a perverse incentive to catch fish as quickly as
possible during available days.3 Responsible fishermen who
could otherwise take the time to fish in a safe, profitable and
ecologically conscientious manner are induced to put aside
these goals in an attempt to catch as many fish as possible
in the few days they have available. Fishermen are given
little incentive to avoid overfished stocks and target healthier
populations; in order to reduce pressure on overfished
stocks, effort controls become so restrictive that it is no
longer possible to harvest an optimal quantity of the few
remaining healthy stocks. The result is inefficient, costly,
unsafe and more damaging to the environment. As fish
stocks and profits decline, perverse incentives only increase.
Days-at-Sea Allocations Have Not Promoted
Sustainability
Since the beginning of the days-at-sea program in New
England, both access and effort have been over-allocated
(Thunberg 2000). Optimal fishing effort for New England
groundfish has been estimated to be approximately 22,000
days (Edwards and Murawski 1993). By comparison, original
allocations provided nearly 250,000 days-at-sea to the New
England fleet—ten times the optimal level (Georgianna
et al. 2008).4
Since 1994, days-at-sea have been continually reduced
and restricted in a largely unsuccessful effort to rebuild fish
stocks.5 Increasingly restrictive limits have been placed on
other forms of effort in recurring attempts to prevent effort
substitution. This trend of continually tightened regulations,
paired with long-term economic waste and decline, is a
common characteristic of fishing effort controls that have
failed worldwide (Edwards 1999; Morgan and Gary 1997).
Days-at-Sea and Effort Controls Eliminate Profits
Days-at-sea limits encourage costly fishing behaviors in an
attempt to harvest fish more quickly. Trip limits require that
fishermen return to port more often or with their vessels
only partially filled, further increasing per unit costs. When
fishermen instead choose to keep fishing for other species,
they must discard species that exceed the trip limit (the fish
are usually killed in the process). The result is a large quantity
of legal but wasteful regulatory discards. Gear restrictions
can also prevent fishermen from using cost-effective fishing
methods. Low fish stocks depress catch-per-unit effort
(fishing effectiveness) and revenue. The result is a dissipation
of profits from the fishery. Repeated allocations of govern-
ment disaster relief funds to the New England fisheries
highlight the precarious economic situation that has resulted.
Harvest Goals Were Too Optimistic
The success of fishery management depends on accurate
science. Even using contemporary methods, many past
stock assessments and models were “in error or did not fully
account for uncertainty” (NEFMC 2009, p. 414). As a result,
even when days-at-sea and other effort controls were able
to maintain harvests within established regulatory limits,
too much fishing and harvest still occurred. The result was
continued overfishing on most stocks and a failure to meet
periodic rebuilding targets.6 As a consequence, the
January 28, 2009, draft of Amendment 16 to the Northeast
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan calls for further
reduction in fishing mortality. If this is accomplished using
effort or input controls, it will result in even more restrictive
and costly limits on the activities of fishermen.
Why Have Days-at-Sea Limits Failed in New England and Elsewhere?
“It’s time for things to change. Days-at-sea have led to discarding
and waste and put too many fishermen out of business. Sectors
are the last chance for our industry in New England.”
Glen Libby, Midcoast Fishermen’s Association, Port Clyde, Maine, FV Skipper
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FIGURE 4
Category “A” Days-at-Sea Allocated and Used, 2001–2007
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Trip Limits – A Fisherman’s
Perspective
“[A] fisherman who catches 2,000
pounds of fish on Monday has to
throw 1,000 pounds away, then
gas up and go out again on Tues-
day. But maybe he only catches
500 pounds on Tuesday, so he
has to go out Wednesday as well.
It ends up costing more to catch
the same amount of fish, which
means fishermen have to catch
more to make the same profit.”
BRUCE KAMINSKI, FISHERMAN
(QUOTED BY NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(WGBH) 2009)
Economics 101: Perverse Incentives
A perverse incentive is an unintended
motive, often created by a government
regulation, that encourages more of
an unwanted or negative behavior.
Effort controls in fisheries often create
perverse incentives that encourage
less stewardship, more wasteful fishing
and faster decline of fisheries.
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The management system also tends to put in place regulations that fishermen
view as complex, cumbersome and inappropriate. Many countries have encoun-
tered similar difficulties and have concluded that heavy government involvement
in fishery management, particularly using effort controls, is burdensome and inef-
fective. These countries have responded by devolving much of the responsibility
of management to organizations of fishermen, sharing accountability with fishery
participants. Examples of shared management, called co-management, abound
in Canada, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Co-management often increases
compliance with fishery regulations, decreases enforcement costs and increases
satisfaction with management (Sutinen and Johnston 2003; Townsend et al. 2008).
Evidence from Worldwide Fisheries:
Can We Do Better?
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FIGURE 5
Estimated Cost Savings Attributable to Chignik
Salmon Cooperative, 2002–2004
The Alaskan Pollock
Conservation Cooperative:
Increasing Quality
and Profits
The American Fisheries Act allowed
creation of the Alaskan Pollock
Conservation Cooperative (PCC) in
1998. Wilen and Richardson (2008)
detail the outcomes of the PCC.
These include greater profits and
product value. Since its inception,
the PCC has increased efficiency
and returns by fine-tuning fishing
operations, coordinating operations
and tailoring product mix to market
conditions. Catcher vessel and
processor operations are able to
increase the quality of raw fish by
slowing operations, thus enhancing
value. Reduction in derby fishing is
illustrated by a 40 percent decline
in daily catch per vessel. Product
recovery (the proportion of usable
product from raw fish) increased
from 19.5 percent prior to the
cooperative to 24.6 percent in the
first year of the PCC, with subse-
quent gains to over 30 percent.
A recent report by the National Academy of Public Administration
concludes that the U.S. fishery management system has “increasingly
struggled under the burdens of conservation, environmental protection,
over-exploitation and increased statutory and policy mandates.”
NAPA 2002, P. IX
Benefits of a Voluntary
Cooperative: The Montauk
Tilefish Association
The Montauk Tilefish Association
(MTA) comprises a small number
of vessels that together harvest the
majority of U.S. Northwest Atlantic
tilefish. The owners of these vessels
(Fishery Management Plan Permit
Category A) voluntarily formed the
Montauk Tilefish Association (MTA)
to coordinate fishing, cooperatively
managing combined landings for
all MTA vessels. The existence of
competing tilefish vessels (Permit
categories B and C) that fish non-
cooperatively under their own group
limits provides a natural experiment
contrasting a cooperative and
non-cooperative fishery. As noted
by Pinto, DaSilva and Kitts (2006, p.
837) “Since forming the Association,
[MTA] vessels have never fished
more than their allocation, have
not shortened their fishing season,
and have maintained their share
agreements.” Analysis of data from
Rountree et al. (2008) shows that
2006 prices received by MTA vessels
exceeded those received by non-
association vessels by an average
of 20 percent, due to the ability
of Association vessels to coordinate
harvests year-round (Figure 6).
Season length in 2006 was 13–30
weeks longer for MTA vessels
compared to non-MTA vessels,
and formation of the MTA has made
fishing safer (Rountree et al. 2008).
“[MTA vessels] have gone from
becoming a threat to the resource to
becoming stewards and managers”
(Rountree et al. 2008, p. 145).
FIGURE 6
Montauk Tilefish Association (MTA) Prices, Fishing Year 2006
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Experience worldwide has demonstrated the benefits of directly limiting harvests
(i.e., output controls). Quotas are established for a portion of the allowable catch
and allocated to individuals or groups (through limited access privilege programs,
LAPPs) (Costello et al. 2008; Heal and Schlenker 2008). Those holding quotas
decide how and when to harvest their allocated quantity, with fewer government
restrictions other than limits on total catch. In some cases, allocated harvest
quantities can be transferred or leased between groups, further increasing the
potential for economic benefit. A National Research Council study of such
programs concludes that “allocation of permits to harvest a portion of [allowable
harvest] is a management tool with high potential for efficiency and stewardship”.
It can be successful in fisheries where other types of regulations fail “to prevent
a race for fish and overharvesting, and in which economic efficiency, safety, and
product quality suffer” (NRC 1999, p. 12).
Experience with co-management and LAPPs provides
evidence of the benefits that can be achieved, particularly
when the advantages of both approaches are combined.
Such coordinated efforts are often called fishery harvest
cooperatives; in New England they are called sectors.
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The End of a Derby: The
Pacific Whiting Conservation
Cooperative (PWCC)
In 1997 the PWCC put an end to
the derby fishing that had previously
pervaded the whiting fishery. Before
the PWCC, companies used all per-
mitted vessels to harvest as rapidly
as possible; high catch rate per unit
time was the primary goal. After the
PWCC, rapid harvest became less
important, shifting the focus to goals
such as market timing, product quality
and economic efficiency. In the first
year, the cooperative witnessed an
approximately 260 percent increase
in season length, from 33 to 83 days.
Since then, average season length
for the catcher-processor sector has
ranged from 82 to 197 days. There
have been measurable improvements
in safety. The PWCC has also allowed
owners to invest in equipment that
improves product yield and quality
rather than maximizing capacity for
rapid processing. As a result, product
recovery has increased going from 17
percent to 24 percent in the first year
of the cooperative alone. These and
other outcomes are detailed by
Sylvia et al. (2008).
Although different types of harvest cooperatives or sectors exist, most share a
similar structure. A self-organized group of fishermen is given a renewable privilege
to harvest a specific quantity and type of fish. This quantity is usually given as a
percentage of a sustainable total allowable catch (TAC) of individual stocks. The
group is given the accountability to manage its members and ensure that harvest
limits are not exceeded. This gives responsibility and authority to fishermen to
develop fishing approaches best suited to their particular component of the fishery.
Government oversight ensures that the total group harvest remains within specified
limits. In return for maintaining total catches within specified limits, the cooperative
or sector can opt out of many of the restrictive and wasteful effort controls—such
as days-at-sea, seasonal closures and trip limits—previously imposed upon
individual fishermen.7
Performance of Harvest Cooperatives
Harvest cooperatives exist in many fisheries worldwide and have a history of positive
results. There are many reasons why cooperatives tend to outperform other manage-
ment alternatives. Strong, renewable harvest privileges encourage sustainable and
profitable use of fishery resources, as well as greater stewardship. Accountability
provides incentives for cost-effective and responsive management as well as greater
compliance. Cooperation among fishermen provides opportunities to fine-tune
fishing and processing operations, coordinate fishing to reduce costs and environ-
mental impacts, and tailor product timing and mix to suit market conditions.
These advantages are not just hypothetical—results of harvest cooperatives such
as the Montauk Tilefish Association, Alaskan Pollock Conservation Cooperative,
Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative and others demonstrate clear biological
and economic benefits. These include longer seasons, increased sustainable land-
ings and profits, reduced bycatch and waste, higher product quality and recovery
rates, and safer fishing.
Cooperatives also increase satisfaction among fishermen. Knapp (2008) reports that
70 percent of fishermen had either very or somewhat positive feelings regarding
the Chignik Salmon Cooperative in Alaska, at least in part due to cost savings,
improved product quality and numerous innovations brought about through the
cooperative (Figure 5).8 Similar benefits are found in other examples of fishery
self-governance in other parts of the world (Townsend et al. 2008).
Harvest Cooperatives and Sectors:
A Way Forward
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Although multispecies New England groundfish sectors
would not be identical to single-species harvest coopera-
tives,9 many of the same advantages apply. Despite these
advantages, as of early 2009 there were only two sectors
approved by the New England Fishery Management
Council—the Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector and the
Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector. Unlike cooperatives
elsewhere, these sectors operate under most of the effort
controls imposed on the non-sector groundfish fleet,
including days-at-sea limits. The primary benefits of
membership for these sectors include exemption from
cod trip limits and certain seasonal area closures (Holland
2007). Although exact effects of these sectors can be diffi-
cult to separate from those caused by other events, results
suggest many positive outcomes. These include an increase
in total fishing revenues per vessel in the Cod Hook Sector
from 2005 to 2007 and a reduction in regulatory discards
from the Fixed Gear Sector.10 The Fixed Gear Sector was
able to nearly triple cod landings and revenues relative
to prior averages, and increase per-day landings from 460
to 740 lbs., reflecting more efficient operations. At the
same time, both sectors have kept harvests within
mandated limits.
Beyond these and other quantitative benefits, anecdotal
evidence suggests broad satisfaction with sectors and
support for wider applications (Venkataraman 2009;
National Public Radio (WGBH) 2009). Reflecting this
support, the January 28, 2009, draft version of Amendment
16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan includes more extensive provisions for New England
sectors. As reported in the draft Amendment, the holders
of nearly 650 groundfish permits (the majority of active
groundfish vessels) have expressed initial interest in
joining one of 19 sectors.11
FIGURE 7
Projected Effort Reductions under New England
Sectors: Days-at-Sea Required for Trawl Portion
of Groundfish Harvest
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“Giving communities the flexibility to devise
appropriate management applications has
virtually eliminated all the criticism and
lobbying of previous planning approaches.
The approach allows community solutions
to the problems of fish management,
including many aspects of monitoring and
enforcement, transfers of quota and catch
history and conservation of the resource.”
PEACOCK AND ANNAND 2008, P. 109
Advantages of Sectors
in New England
“Sectors offer fishermen the
opportunity to: increase efficiency
by increasing flexibility of when
and where to fish; manage fishing
operations to meet social as well as
economic objectives of the sector;
concentrate on increasing quality
and value of fish caught without
concern for lost fishing time; make
targeting and location decisions
without concern for lost fishing
time; avoid having to return to port
or discard fish because a trip limit
is reached for one species; and
transfer (share, trade or consolidate)
catch privileges among sector
members to reduce fishing costs.”
HOLLAND 2007, P. 2
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Although outcomes will depend on the ways in which sectors are regulated and
implemented in New England, economic models suggest some of the potential
benefits that participants could expect. Holland (2007) reports two economic case
studies of prospective community-based groundfish sectors in Portland and Port
Clyde, Maine.12 Although the costs of establishing and operating sectors depend
on many factors, the predicted gain in revenues is substantial, ranging from 16
percent to 28 percent in the Portland sector and 44 percent to 79 percent in the
Port Clyde sector (Figure 8). Predicted total net revenue increases from establish-
ment of the two Maine sectors range from $6.2 million to $7.4 million. A similar
analysis reported in draft Amendment 16 suggests that New England groundfish
trawl vessels could reduce fishing effort by 60 percent under sectors without any
loss of harvest (Figure 7). These gains in efficiency are similar to those seen in other
fisheries operating under comparable management systems (Michelin 2008).
Increased catch of healthy fish stocks, reduced regulatory discards, and other
sector benefits result from the exemption of sectors from restrictions including
days-at-sea, rolling closures, and trip limits. These exemptions can allow sector
vessels to harvest more efficiently and with reduced ecological impact.13 Additional
gains (not included in these estimates) might be realized through reduced operat-
ing costs and improvements in product quality, marketing and harvest timing,
outcomes found repeatedly in harvest cooperatives elsewhere (Townsend et al.
2008). These findings suggest that “sector management can provide substantial
gains in net revenues … and that these gains far outweigh the costs of establishing
and operating a sector” (Holland 2007, p.3).
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FIGURE 8
Hypothetical Port Clyde Groundfish Sector Projected Annual Net
Revenue Gain
Tradeoffs Between Sectors
and Individual Fishing
Quotas: Results Depend
on the Fishery
“[I]t is difficult to discuss the
implementation of these programs
without consideration of the
specific nature of each fishery
and the social and economic
communities associated with it…,
Each region is unique in terms of
its biologic, social, and economic
characteristics.”
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 1999, P. 4
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Sectors can also provide greater stewardship incentives. These are related to
fishermen’s ability to realize clear and direct benefits from ecologically responsible
behavior. For example, if sectors stay within their annual quotas, they are assured
that their quotas will not be reduced in the following year as a consequence of
overharvest by other vessels. This provides an incentive to maintain harvests within
limits, regardless of the activity of non-sector vessels.
Despite the advantages of sectors, their financial viability depends in part on
regulatory, administrative and other burdens imposed by management regulations
(Michelin 2008; Holland 2007). These influence the costs of implementing and
operating a sector. Preliminary scenarios suggest that the economic benefits14 of
New England groundfish sectors relative to the status quo could range from -$19.5
million to +$91.8 million, depending on factors including the discount rate and
operating costs (Michelin 2008). Based on these and other results, Michelin (2008)
finds that “under a set of reasonable assumptions, industry will be able to cover the
cost of operating the sector program,” but emphasizes the importance of programs
that are “economically viable, within different ecological and social contexts”
(pp. 28, 31).
Regulations must balance a need for adequate monitoring, environmental protec-
tion, enforcement and compliance with the imposition of costs that might prohibit
otherwise beneficial sectors. Costs that would be borne by sectors under the
January 28, 2009, draft Amendment 16 (p. 442) include “one-time costs such as
the costs to organize, acquire office equipment and space, prepare and submit a
proposal, prepare the initial supporting NEPA document, and prepare and submit
annual reports,” as well as “continuing costs [related to] the day-to-day administra-
tion of the sector, monitoring requirements, and preparation of periodic updates
to the operations plan and supporting NEPA document.” These could represent a
substantial impediment to sector formation (Holland 2007). Although evidence
from models of New England groundfish sectors (Michelin 2008; Holland 2007) and
fisheries outside New England suggests that new revenues from sectors and other
harvest cooperatives can far exceed new costs, avoidance of unnecessary costs
can be an important step in enhancing the economic feasibility of sectors in New
England. Mechanisms for reducing the regulatory burden on sector organizers,
while ensuring that environmental and other important public interests are
maintained, are a crucial element of sector development and oversight.
Orienting Management
around Community Need
The Fundy Fixed Gear Council,
established in 1996, manages
inshore, fixed gear groundfishing
on the Nova Scotia side of the Bay
of Fundy. Among other successes,
this community-based cooperative
has been credited with promoting
compliance with fishing plans and
encouraging survival of the local
fishing fleet. This and other cooper-
atives have helped orient fishery
management around community
needs in the Canadian Maritimes.
CHARLES ET AL. 2007
“Sectors allow me to plan my business in a way that trip limits
and days-at-sea never did. There’s a lot more flexibility when you
combine your resources and manage your fishery as a community
than when it’s managed at the federal level.”
Eric Hesse, Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association, Chatham,
Massachusetts, FV Tenacious II
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Alternatives to Sectors
Regulatory alternatives to harvest cooperatives or sectors include: (1) the status
quo; (2) non-allocated, fishery-wide TACs;15 (3) more restrictive effort controls; and
(4) individual harvest privileges such as individual fishing quotas (IFQs). All of these
are inferior to sectors for one or more important reasons. The status quo (no
change in current regulations) would continue the negative trends outlined above,
with ongoing losses in fishery resources, economic benefits and fishing communi-
ties. Non-allocated TACs, in turn, may encourage extreme and wasteful fishing
derbies, leading to outcomes such as the two-day season for Alaska halibut in 1994
prior to the successful implementation of IFQs (NRC 1999). Increasingly more
restrictive effort controls might succeed in reducing harvest, but they would do so
through even greater and more wasteful restrictions on the fishing industry, further
depressing any potential for economic recovery.
Individual fishing quotas are among the most promising of the alternatives to
sectors. Like harvest cooperatives, IFQs have been applied successfully in many
fisheries worldwide, with positive biological and economic outcomes (NRC 1999;
Costello et al. 2008; Heal and Schlenker 2008). An important advantage of IFQs
is that management costs borne by fishermen are often lower than those under
sectors or cooperatives. However, sectors offer many advantages not often pro-
vided by IFQs. These include the ability to coordinate harvest timing and location,
product mix and marketing to increase net benefits.16 Sectors also provide an
opportunity to coordinate fishing activity among sector members to minimize
fishing costs. Economic advantages of coordinated efforts are found in many
fisheries (Townsend et al. 2008). Such advantages provide the potential for greater
economic benefits under sectors than might be possible under IFQs. Individual
sectors’ members can also be held liable for regulatory infractions of the sector as
a whole, creating strong incentives for internal enforcement. This may reduce
monitoring and enforcement costs relative to IFQs, thereby increasing profitability
if these costs are recovered from industry.
Finally, harvest cooperatives or sectors are often perceived to be more equitable
and community-friendly; there are fewer concerns about quota consolidation by
corporations or individuals and the potential transfer of harvest shares to vessels
operating elsewhere. Unlike other management approaches, sectors can “provide
the means for a community and its fishermen to retain or regain access to the
groundfish fishery and to ensure that the community benefits from this access”
(Holland 2007, p. 2), preserving fishing heritage. As noted by the National Research
Council (1999, p. 2), however, there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to fisheries.
Mechanisms such as sectors and IFQs should be evaluated case-by-case to
determine methods best suited to specific fisheries.
Sectors: Balancing the
Benefits and Costs
Harvest cooperatives and sectors
shift some regulatory, monitoring
and enforcement costs from gov-
ernment to the fishing industry. Is
this burden too onerous? Evidence
suggests that the benefits of
harvest cooperatives often far
outweigh new management costs
covered by fishermen. For exam-
ple, the cooperative that harvests
clams in British Columbia
(geoducks)—the Underwater
Harvesters Association (UHA)—
now bears a substantial portion
of fishery management costs.
However, “the increase in value
of the fishery and improvements
in management have warranted
these costs,” with an increase in
average landed price of geoduck
from $0.17/lb to over $9.50/lb and
a decline in fishing costs. “This
voluntary organization has worked
because harvesters see that their
fishery and industry is better off
with the association.”
JAMES 2008, PP. 404-406
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The potential benefits of improved fishery
management in New England are well-estab-
lished. Over 15 years ago, Edwards and
Murawski (1993 p. 437) estimated that improved
management of New England groundfish
could result in a “sevenfold increase in the size
of the harvestable resource and a threefold
increase in sustainable yield,” along with an
increase in sustainable economic value of $224
million per year (adjusted to 2009 dollars).
Analysis conducted in 2003 suggested that
the cumulative net present value of rebuilding
relative to the status quo is close to $300 million
(2003 dollars), but could exceed $400 million
to $500 million in some scenarios.17 Far from
approaching these goals, the fishery has
instead experienced continued declines in
fish stocks, landings and revenues.
A transition to more responsible management,
including sectors with annual catch limits,
provides a potential path to such benefits.
The advantages of cooperatives and sectors
are supported by economic theory, empirical
models and the experience of fishermen.
The capacity to generate sustainable positive
outcomes has been demonstrated by similar
approaches worldwide. Positive results from
current groundfish sectors, together with models
of potential sectors, show that similar benefits
can be realized in New England. Four centuries
of New England fisheries provide no evidence
that continued effort controls will restore either
prosperity or sustainability. There are many
ongoing challenges to fishery management
and no easy solutions. Appropriately designed
sectors or harvest cooperatives, however, offer
a potential future of more responsible, profitable
and sustainable fisheries.
New England Fisheries:
Prospects for a Brighter Future
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Endnotes
1 New England Fishery Management Council (2006; 2003, Appendix I) and Olson and Clay (2001).
2 A stock that is subject to overfishing has a fishing harvest rate above the level that provides for
the maximum sustainable yield or stock recovery. A stock that is overfished has a biomass level
below a targeted biological threshold specified in its fishery management plan.
3 In more technical terms, it creates incentives to maximize revenue within the allocated number
of fishing days rather than maximize the economic profits that could otherwise be obtained from
harvesting a given amount of fish more slowly and efficiently.
4 Allocation mechanisms were based on vessel fishing history (either individual or fleet averages);
these mechanisms caused many vessels to be given more days-at-sea than they had fished in
prior years (Georgianna et al. 2008; Thunberg 2000).
5 Note that differential counting of days-at-sea was introduced in 2004, such that multiple days
were counted for each day used in certain fishing areas, further reducing effective days for ves-
sels operating in these areas.
6 As noted in the January 28, 2009, draft of Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan (p. 414), these harvest limits were based on stock assessment information avail-
able at the time they were established. As new information was incorporated, these limits were
found to be incompatible with planned rebuilding for most stocks.
7 Agencies may still apply regulations to protect habitat and promote other important ecological
or economic goals.
8 Despite support from most fishery participants, the Cooperative was dissolved by a 2006 Alaska
Supreme Court ruling that it violated an Alaska law provision requiring permit holders to oper-
ate their own vessels (Knapp 2008).
9 For example, under sectors, the total annual allocation given to a sector is based on the aggre-
gate shares of the permits (vessels) in that sector. Members coordinate harvest to stay within the
allocation; the sector and its members are held collectively accountable for keeping catches
below the allocation. A sector cannot buy and sell quota (e.g., to other sectors) in permanent
form, only as a one-year catch entitlement. Sector membership can change from year to year,
with the sector’s annual harvest allocation adjusted according to current members’ aggregate
permit shares.
10 January 28, 2009, draft of Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan, p. 272 and 415.
11 These include the two currently operating sectors and seventeen proposed sectors.
12 Projections are based on projected rebuilding and TACs from Amendment 13, the most up-to-
date at the time.
13 Sector provisions in the January 28, 2009, draft of Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies
Fishery Management Plan (p. 88-89) allow potential exemption from a broader range of effort
controls than is the case for the two currently operating sectors.
14 Net present value.
15 Total allowable catch limits enforced by closing the fishery when total harvest limits are reached.
16 IFQs do not preclude such coordinated efforts, but they are much more likely under sectors.
17 Pages I-xii and I-602 of Amendment 13 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan.
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